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1. Introduction 
The universal service obligation (USO) is a cornerstone of regulatory policy in the postal sector. 
In the EU, where the sector is headed towards full liberalization, the USO is the major argument 
used to advocate some residual regulation. In the postal sector, like in many other network 
industries, universal service was historically provided by a monopolistic public or regulated 
operator. While the need for monopoly protection has been increasingly disputed, the very idea 
of universal service has remained relatively uncontested during the early stages of the 
liberalization process. The debate was not that much about the appropriate extent of the USO but 
about the most efficient (or least costly) way to make it competitively neutral, or at least as 
compatible as possible with competition. This in itself is a challenging question.  
 
More recently, however, the USO in itself has increasingly been questioned. The question is 
whether the social benefits associated with the USO are significant enough to justify its cost and 
in particular the impediment to competition it often implies. The spectacular development of 
electronic communications is likely to further fuel this debate.  
 
To ensure a sound design of the future regulatory context in the postal sector, it is important not 
to restrict this debate to political or ideological considerations. The underlying economic aspects 
are of crucial importance and have to be given thorough consideration. While there are some 
papers in the literature that deal with this issue, it appears fair to say that most of the 
contributions on USO have concentrated on the “how” (to implement) rather than on the “why” 
(to impose it and to what extent). This is true to some extent for all network industries but even 
more so for the postal sector.7  
 
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the benefits and costs of the USO in the postal sector. 
                                                 
7 Exception are Cremer et al. (1997) and Cremer et al. (2001). Crew and Kleindorfer (1998) study the relationship 
between USO and reserved area under entry. Doing this they also discuss the nature of and justification for the USO. 
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We present and assess alternative economic justifications of the USO. These include the idea that 
a USO may be used as a remedy for network externalities, that a USO is a form of redistributive 
pricing policy, that it can be a channel to supply a public good or an instrument of regional 
policy.  
 
Amongst these, the redistributive pricing argument is probably the most unexpected one and 
needs some further elaboration. Prices are referred to as “redistributive” when they are not solely 
set according to (private or social) efficiency considerations. We argue that USO is first and 
foremost a constraint on pricing; the obligation to provide service without an affordable pricing 
requirement would be an empty constraint. We show that USO may be an optimal second best 
policy, and that this is true even within the sender pays context of the postal sector. We also 
identify the (social) costs of USO and suggest some avenues along which a formal cost benefit 
analysis of USO can be carried out. 
  
Another aspect that will be explored is the role of the postal network as “intermediary” between 
firms and consumers (who interact through the “platform” provided by the postal network). This 
is related to the notion of network externality that has traditionally been used to justify the USO 
in telecommunications. However, the recent literature on two sided markets has taken a fresh 
look at these forms of interactions. Specifically, it has brought together the notions of usage and 
membership externalities and studied their implications on the pricing rules. One of the messages 
that has emerged from this literature is that “membership fees” on one side of the market may be 
below cost (or even negative). We shall examine if and to what extent the view of the postal 
network as a two sided market can provide a rationale for a USO. 
  
Before proceeding it is useful to briefly review the definition of a USO. It involves the obligation 
of an operator to supply a specific package of goods and services, of a determined quality, to all 
users at “affordable” rates. In the European Union, a minimum definition is contained in the EU 
directives. It can be reinforced by individual member countries according to the principle of 
subsidiarity. In Germany or in France for instance, the requirement concerning the delivery 
frequency goes beyond the minimal EU requirements of 5 days a week. Similarly, uniformity of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Some further discussion is also provided by Crew and Kleindorfer (2007).   
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prices is not an obligation but just a possible option. Nevertheless,, many Member States 
(including the UK, Denmark and France) have transposed in their law a uniformity obligation 
(for products within the scope of USO)  rather than just an “affordability”  requirement8. 
 
Studying the rationale of USO involves two different questions. First, we can look for a 
justification of the USO on welfare grounds, taking into account the various constraints that the 
policy makers may face. Alternatively one can adopt a positive approach and explain why the 
USO is effectively imposed in most network industries. In this paper we focus on the first aspect 
while keeping the issue of political constraint in mind. We present a critical review of the major 
arguments that can justify a USO in the postal sector.  
 
2. Redistribution 
1. Basic idea 
The USO can be seen as a special case of redistributive pricing, that is a policy meant to achieve 
redistribution through prices instead of (or in addition to) income taxation and/or “direct” 
transfers. This statement may come as a surprise and the reader may wonder why we refer to 
USO as a pricing policy and why we qualify it as redistributive. Consequently, two clarifying 
remarks are in order. First, one has to keep in mind the USO is primarily a constraint on pricing. 
The restrictions on pricing are a crucial ingredient in its definition. Without such a restriction, the 
obligation to provide service would be an empty constraint. An operator who can charge a price 
that is sufficiently large to cover cost has no reason to refuse the provision of service. Second, 
the term redistributive is used here to designate considerations that are not covered by efficiency. 
In other words, redistributive prices are prices that differ from those set on pure efficiency 
grounds (e.g., marginal cost driven).  
 
Observe that a USO may imply two types of redistribution. First, towards high-cost customers 
                                                 
8 See Ambrosini, Boldron and Roy (2005) for a description of the obligations in the different countries according to 
three dimensions: scope of products, quality requirements and price regulation. 
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(e.g. single piece mail users) or adressees (e.g., mail sent to rural households). This is achieved 
through uniform pricing or whenever price differentials (between consumer groups) fall short of 
cost differentials. Second there may be redistribution towards low-income (or otherwise needy) 
individuals. Illustrations are social tariffs (in telecommunications or electricity). In the postal 
sector, the first aspect appears to be the most relevant.9 However, in reality, cost and income may 
be correlated : in France, low income people are more likely to live in rural areas.10 They benefit 
from universal service in two ways: first, as individuals senders, they benefit from the 
“affordable” redistributive price of the single-piece stamp, and second as addressees, they benefit 
from uniform pricing (see Section 3 below). 
When viewed as redistributive pricing, a USO bears some similarities with policies involving 
“public provision of private goods” or in-kind transfers. The basic feature of these policies is that 
some essentially private goods like education, child care or health care are provided either free of 
charges or at (sometimes highly) subsidized prices.  
2. Economic background 
These policies can be justified in two ways. The first justification relies on the notion of specific 
egalitarism introduced by Tobin (1970). According to this view some goods are considered as 
essential in that they satisfy basic needs. Consequently, they ought to be made available to 
everyone irrespective of income, location or other considerations. This argument is often used to 
justify universal provision of health care or education but it can also apply to basic postal 
services. It is considered as debatable by many authors because it relies on the notion of 
paternalistic, non-Paretian preferences. Nevertheless it is a very popular view which typically 
draws a good deal of political support.  
 
A more subtle (and less ad hoc) justification can be found in the public economics literature 
where it has been shown that such policies can be optimal in a second-best setting; that is when 
the policy makers do not have the necessary information to implement (potentially) more 
efficient policies like direct transfers. A detailed survey of this literature would go beyond the 
scope of this paper and we shall restrict ourselves to reviewing the arguments which are most 
                                                 
9This is true at least for mail services. Some financial services provided by post banks fall in the second category. 
10See Roy (1999) for an analysis of cost drivers in  postal delivery, and  Bernard et al. (2001), for a comparison between France 
and USA, studying the costs of delivery rural areas and/or to low income households. 
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relevant for the problem under investigation.  
 
The gist of the argument is that the use of price subsidies makes it easier to target redistribution. 
Consider the case of health care. Provision at subsidized prices may create over-consumption and 
thus imply an inefficient outcome. Consequently, if the objective of the public authorities is to 
help the less-healthy individuals it would appear more efficient to do so directly, through a 
personalized transfer. Now, this is certainly true in a (hypothetical) world where public 
authorities can perfectly observe individual characteristics and can distinguish the needy from 
the well-off individuals. In reality, this is hardly the case and direct transfers to less-healthy 
individuals may be difficult to implement. Specifically, if sick individuals are entitled to some 
transfer, everyone has an incentive to pretend that he is needy and the verification of these claims 
would be impossible or very costly. However, if instead health care expenses are subsidized, the 
redistribution appears to be better targeted, even though it may come at the expense of some 
inefficiency (over-consumption).  
 
To sum up, though potential generators of inefficiencies, price subsidies (or public provision at 
free or highly subsidized rates) may be an effective instrument of redistributive policies if 
alternative instruments (like personalized transfers) are not feasible for informational (or other) 
reasons. Observe also that political considerations may prevent direct transfers. This is most 
striking in the context of agricultural policy, but in the postal sector the replacement of USO by 
direct aid to rural residents may not be politically feasible either.  
3. Redistributing through USO in a sender-pays sector 
The view of the USO in the postal sector as a redistributive policy may give rise to two 
objections. First, in this sector, cost differentials arise mainly because of the locations (and types) 
of the addressees; the paying customers, on the other hand, are the senders. Second, the postal 
budget of a typical household is small and one can thus argue that the achieved redistribution is 
rather insignificant.  
 
To establish that a USO can operate significant redistribution between, say, urban and rural 
individuals, it thus has to be shown that the eventual beneficiaries of the USO are not so much 
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the senders, but rather the addressees, and specifically, the high-cost households. This claim is 
supported by at least three arguments.  
 
First, the existence of cost differentials according to the location of the addressee is, to a certain 
extent, due to the USO. It is because operators face the obligation of delivering to the addressees’ 
mailbox at a given frequency that rural delivery is more expensive. In the absence of a USO, 
reduced frequency, post office box delivery or similar measures could be implemented by the 
operator in order to eliminate the excess costs in rural delivery11. Such an adjustment would 
certainly have a much more significant impact on rural households than on the senders of the 
various mail items.  
 
Second, in the absence of a USO, the postal operators could charge rural households for the 
delivery cost differentials by imposing a (periodic) fixed fee on those who opt for home delivery 
(rather then at some collective delivery point). In reality, such “connecting charges” do, of 
course, not exist in the postal sector (at least not in Europe), but this does not mean that the 
operators might not find such a pricing scheme optimal if the USO were removed. Now, the 
arguments which oppose such differential fees (and which may make them hard to accept on 
political grounds) are essentially of redistributive nature. From that perspective, the redistributive 
role of the USO is that it precludes certain (non linear) pricing schemes which would impose a 
heavier burden on high cost customers.  
 
Third, most mail products are inputs rather then final goods. A large proportion of letters (and 
mail items in general) are sent by businesses, and economic analysis shows that firms generally 
manage to shift (at least part of) their costs to customers. Put differently, cost increases in postal 
items will, in general, lead to price increases for final goods or services, using mail as an input. 
Under uniform pricing in the postal sector, banks for instance, have no reason to charge rural 
customers more for the mailing of their bank statements than they charge their urban customers. 
However, if mailing costs were different, bank may find it profitable to differentiate fees 
according to the location of a customer. A similar argument goes through for many other types of 
                                                 
11 See Boldron et al. (2006) for a study of the cost savings associated with a decrease in the number of routes.in rural 
areas. 
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businesses and, in particular, for mail-order corporations. It is very likely that the burden of a 
removal of the uniform pricing requirement would eventually fall on the high-cost customers.  
 
Consequently, the USO does effectively redistribute between high and low cost customers and 
the significance of this redistribution goes beyond the budget that rural customers directly spend 
on mail. The crucial point is that this redistribution is achieved indirectly because it concerns an 
input the cost of which will be reflected in the price of final goods. For example, the budget 
spent by each household (including small businesses) as a sender is about 68€ per annum in 
France. As an addressee, the average household receives a “mail budget” of 425€, that is more 
than six times the direct postal expenditures.. A formal model that illustrates and substantiates 
this argument is presented in Appendix A.  
 
So far, we have focused on equity issues. We now examine if and how a USO can be justified on 
efficiency grounds.  
3. Network externalities and economic intermediation 
1. Traditional view 
Network externalities are a classical justification of USO in telecommunications (see e.g. 
Riordan 2001). They arise when the benefits from using a network depend on the number of 
individuals who are connected to the network. Telecommunications provide a prominent 
example: the number of subscribers determines the number of individuals any particular user can 
communicate with. Consequently, any individual’s decision to subscribe or not directly affects 
the utility of other individuals. However, when deciding upon participation, any particular 
consumer will only take his own (private) benefits into account. These externalities may lead to 
an inefficient outcome in an unregulated market and have an adverse effect on the development 
of the network. Specifically, one can expect participation rates to be too low. These 
inefficiencies may be reduced, through regulatory measures promoting the affordability of access 
to the network such as USO. From that perspective, USO can be seen as a device to correct 
market inefficiencies in the presence of network externalities.  
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This traditional view relies on a symmetric view of externalities where all subscribers are 
potential callers and receivers. This view is probably of limited relevance for the postal sector.  
2. Externalities, intermediation and the two sided market approach 
A more modern approach to network externalities is provided by the “two-sided markets” 
framework. In this setting, a market is viewed as a platform (intermediary) for exchanges 
between agents on its two sides. The membership and/or usage on one side of the market affects 
the utility or profit opportunities on the other side. This gives rise to membership and/or usage 
externalities that are no longer symmetric. Take the prominent example of payment cards. The 
utility of a cardholder depends on the number of outlets that accept the card. Conversely the 
benefits of say a restaurant from accepting the card depends on the number of cardholders. These 
externalities affect pricing policies and in many circumstances it is desirable to “subsidize” 
membership or usage on one side of the market.  
 
While the postal sector differs in several respects from the sectors that have been studied in the 
two-sided market literature, this view of externalities has interesting implications for the 
interpretation of a USO.12 The postal sector acts as an intermediary between firms and 
households. Firms’ benefits from relying on postal products (as opposed to alternative media) 
depend on the number of households that can be reached (with a given quality of service). 
Conversely, households may benefit from the presence of a large number of firms. A USO can 
then be seen as a device to internalize these externalities. For instance, a direct application of 
two-sided market models to the case of pricing of usage and “membership” would show that 
making addressees pay for home delivery is not likely to be optimal. The free home delivery 
mentioned above for its redistributive merits could thus also be justified on efficiency grounds. 
We do not further pursue the issue of addressee’s payments here since a fully-fledged study of 
postal sector pricing from a two-sided market perspective would go beyond the scope of this 
paper and is left for future research.13  
 
                                                 
12With the exception of Panzar (2006), who studies PO boxes, the two-sided market literature has to our knowledge not yet dealt 
with the postal sector. 
13In any event, addressees’ payments for delivery do not appear to be an issue for the time being, at least not in Europe. Note 
however that some types of delivery, such as to PO box, are not free and represent an interesting example of a receiver payment 
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Instead, we use some ingredients of the two-sided market approach but focus on quality rather 
than pricing. In Appendix B, we consider a simple model where the benefits of senders depend 
on coverage of delivery network at a certain level of service (defined, for instance, by the 
number of deliveries per week). We also consider the possibility of a “call externality” according 
to which an addressee’s utility depends on the number of mail items he receives.14 We show that 
a profit-maximizing (monopoly) operator can be expected to choose a degree of coverage that is 
too small. This means for instance that the part of the territory subject to six days a week 
delivery tends to be too small under profit maximizing behavior. The underlying problem is 
closely related to a choice of product quality (or quality of service) by a monopolistic firm.  
 
This problem can be solved or at least mitigated through a USO. Under these circumstances USO 
thus appears to be justified on efficiency grounds. Specifically, it is efficiency enhancing when 
the profit-maximizing operator spontaneously sets a degree of coverage (a level of quality) that is 
too low.  
 
This argument is likely to be reinforced if there is competition. In that case, the coverage of the 
incumbent may spill over to entrants’ demands, which in turn increases surplus in that segment. 
A profit-maximizing operator has no reason to take this effect into account and an under-
provision of quality is even more likely.  
 
4. Other arguments 
1. Public/merit good 
It can be argued that a uniform and universal postal network presents the character of a “public 
good” because it “binds the nation together” or it is essential for the functioning of a democracy. 
The argument relies on the idea that the existence of the network is valuable in itself, 
independently of the specific services it provides to the consumers. Consequently, it may apply 
                                                                                                                                                             
(albeit on a membership rather than on a usage basis).  
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even when the provided service is essentially a private good. From that perspective, a USO can 
be seen as a mechanism for the provision of this public good. 
The importance of this aspect has been re-enforced in the recent Directive project launched by 
the Commission on October 2006. In this project, the accessibility of the postal network, (which 
is a component of universal service), is meant to promote social and territorial cohesion 
 
2. Regional policy 
The USO can also be an instrument of regional policies. For instance, uniform pricing can be a 
way to subsidize rural customers, in order to encourage households and firms to locate in rural 
areas (or to prevent them from moving away). Similarly, maintaining basic public services (like 
post offices) in small villages may contribute toward preventing the decline of rural areas. Many 
initiatives at the European level, such as the European Regional Development Fund or the 
European Spatial Development Perspective, pursue the objective of a balanced and sustainable 
spatial development. They are intended to achieve economic and social cohesion, to preserve 
cultural heritage, to manage natural resources and to obtain a more balanced competitiveness of 
the European territory15. Universal Services obligations in the postal sector can be seen as 
instruments to pursue these objectives. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented two complementary perspectives on the benefits of USO. First, we have 
argued that a USO is a form of redistributive pricing that achieves redistribution between low 
cost and high cost consumers. We have shown that within the sender-pays framework adopted in 
the postal sector this redistribution is operated indirectly, through the firms that use postal 
products as inputs (and sell their final goods to households). Second, we have presented an 
argument that relies on externalities and intermediation to show that USO can also be justified on 
efficiency grounds. A delivery network with a large coverage and a high level of quality 
increases demand for postal products (specifically, for industrial mail products). A profit-
                                                                                                                                                             
14Riordan (2001) considers such an externality for the telecommunications sector. 
15 See, Boldron et al.(2007) for more details on those policies 
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maximizing operator does not appropriately account for this effect and sets a suboptimal level of 
coverage/quality. This effect is reinforced when there is a “call externality” (addressees obtain 
utility from receiving mail) and/or when there is competition.  
 
The benefits associated with a USO come at a certain cost. On the one hand, there are the 
distortions to prices and competition and, on the other hand, there is the danger that quality is 
overprovided. For instance, it may not effectively be socially optimal to deliver six times per 
week on the entire territory for a given price.  
 
The first category of costs depends on the design of the policy and, in particular, on the financing 
mechanism that is used. To avoid or mitigate the second type of costs, studies are necessary to 
ensure that appropriate standards are set.  
 
What are the lessons we can learn from our analysis regarding the future role of the USO in a 
postal world of enhanced electronic communications? First or all, it appears that cancelling a 
USO and replacing it by (say) the provision of subsidized stamps to households is not a solution. 
This is because the relevant benefits of a USO are all related to the role of postal products as 
inputs and thus to the industrial mail segment. Furthermore, one can notice that the redistributive 
role of a USO is not directly related to the availability of Internet. These two points suggest that 
a USO does have a role to play in the future. However, we also have to keep in mind that all 
benefits considered depend on the demand for postal products and the role that the sector plays in 
economy. The crucial question that has to be asked is whether this channel of communication 
remains a crucial input for firms.  
 
 13
 
References 
 
Ambrosini, X., F. Boldron and B. Roy (2006), Universal service obligations in the postal sector: 
economic learnings from cross-country comparisons, in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (eds), 
Progress towards Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector, New York: Springer. 
Bernard, S., R.H. Cohen, M.H. Robinson, B. Roy, J. Toledano, J.D Waller and S.S. Xenakis, 
(2002), Delivery cost heterogeneity and vulnerability, in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (eds), 
Postal and Delivery Services: Delivering on Competition, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Boldron, F, K. Dewulf, D. Joram, C. Panet, B. Roy, and O. Vialaneix; (2007), The accessibility 
of the postal retail network and the objectives of social cohesion and economic development, to 
be presented at the 15th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, Semmering, Austria. 
Boldron, F., D. Joram, L. Martin, B. Roy, (2006), From the size of the box to the costs of 
universal service obligations: a cross-country comparison, in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer 
(eds), Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Cremer, H., M. De Rycke and A. Grimaud, (1997), Cost and benefits of universal service in the 
postal sector, in in M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (eds), Managing Change in the Postal and 
Delivery Industries, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Cremer, H., F. Gasmi, A. Grimaud and J.J. Laffont, (2001), Universal service: an economics 
perspective, Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 72, 5–43.  
Crew, M. and P. Kleindorfer, (1998), Efficient entry, monopoly and the universal service 
obligation in Postal Service, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 14, 103-125. 
Crew, M. and P. Kleindorfer, (2007), Multi-national policies for the universal service obligation 
in the postal sector under entry, Review of Network Economics, forthcoming. 
Julien, B., (2005), Two-sided markets and electronic intermediaries, CESifo Economic Studies, 
51, 233–260.  
Panzar, J. (2006), P0 Box Access: Competition Issues in a Two-Sided Postal Market, presented 
at the fourth conference on, Regulation competition and universal service in the postal sector, 
Toulouse, France. 
 14
Riordan, M., (2001), Universal residential telephone service, in: Cave, M, S. Majumdar and I. 
Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Amsterdam Elsevier Science.  
Rochet, J.C. and J. Tirole, (2007), Two-sided markets: a progress report, RAND Journal of 
Economics, forthcoming.  
Roy, B., (1999), Technico-economic analysis of the costs of outside work in postal delivery, in 
M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (eds), Emerging competition in Postal and Delivery Services, 
Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Tobin (1970), On limiting the domain of inequality, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 13, No. 
2, 263-277. 
Varian, H., (1987), Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, WW Norton. 
 15
A. Redistributive pricing under the sender pays principle 
There are N  individuals and two areas indexed u  (urban) and r  (rural). The proportion of 
individuals living in the urban area is denoted by α . The (constant) marginal delivery costs of 
one item of mail differ according to the location of the addressee and are given by u rc c< . All 
individuals consume some good y  (e.g., banking services) that use mail services as input. The 
production of one unit of y  requires one unit of mail. The cost of all other inputs required for 
producing a unit of y  is constant (and independent of location) and given by k.  Let ip  denote 
the prices paid by the producers of y  for mail sent to area i u r= , . The price of y  in area 
i u r= ,  is denoted iq .  Assuming that y  is produced by a competitive industry, we have 
i iq p k= + .  With this linear technology, the cost of the input is entirely shifted to the 
consumer.16 The indirect utility of a consumer located in area i  is given by ( )iv q  while demand 
for y  is denoted by ( )iy q ; in other words, all other prices and incomes are considered as given 
(and mail is only used as input).17  
 
The pricing problem of a (postal) regulator who cares for efficiency and redistribution can then 
be expressed as the maximization of a social welfare function subject to a break-even constraint:  
                                      
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
,
max 1
s.t. 1 0 ,
r
u r
p p
u u u r r r
N p k N p k
N p c y N p c y F
μ α ν α ν
α α
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Ψ + + − Ψ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
− + − − − =
        (1) 
where F  is the postal operator’s fixed cost, ( )i iy y q= ,  i u r= ,  and where Ψ  is an increasing 
and concave function. The degree of concavity reflects the importance of redistribution in the 
regulator’s objective. For instance we can set  
1
,
1
ρν
ρ
−
Ψ = −  
with 0ρ ≥ . For this specification 0ρ =  yields a utilitarian welfare function, which with quasi-
                                                 
16With more general technologies we would get partial shifting: an increase in p  of Δ  would lead to an increase of 
q  of γΔ  with 0 1γ≤ ≤ .  This would complicate the analysis but our argument would remain valid. 
17For simplicity we assume that preferences are quasi-linear so that utility and surplus are equivalent. 
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linear preferences implies that there are no benefits associated with redistribution (social welfare 
is measured by total surplus). At the other extreme, ρ →∞  yields the Rawlsian welfare 
function: social welfare is measured by the utility of the worst-off individual. Observe that this 
problem illustrates the indirect redistribution argument presented in Section 2 above. The price 
of the input (mail products) affects the price of the final good bought by rural and urban 
consumers.  
 
Differentiating the Lagrangian expression associated with this problem yields the following 
pricing rules 
                                                               ' ,
u u
u r
p c
p
λ
ε
− −Ψ=  (2) 
 
'
,
r r
r
r r
p c
p
λ
ε
−Ψ− =  (3) 
 
where iε , i u r= ,  is the absolute value of demand elasticity while λ  is the multiplier of the 
break even constraint. To interpret these expressions, consider first the case where 0F = .  In that 
case, when Ψ  is linear ( 1′Ψ = ; 0)ρ =  the solution implies marginal cost pricing and we have 
r r u uc p p c> ≥ >  When Ψ  is strictly concave, we have u r′ ′Ψ < Ψ  yielding r r u up c p c= > = .  In 
other words, the price differential is smaller than the cost differential. In the Rawlsian case prices 
will be equal. Finally, when 0F > , we have simple Ramsey pricing when 1′Ψ =  and this 
implies r up p>  (unless rε  is much smaller than uε )18. Strict concavity of Ψ  continues to imply 
u r
′ ′Ψ < Ψ  and the price differential will decrease with the degree of concavity. In the Rawlsian 
case prices will again be equal.  
B. Optimal vs. profit maximizing coverage 
Let μ  denote the proportion of the N  addressees (the one with the lowest delivery costs) who 
can be reached through the postal network (with some specified quality of service like for 
instance, home delivery on a 1D +  basis). The utility of the representative customer sending x  
                                                 
18 The equation of the demand elasticity in both areas is the same, because utility functions are identical, but the 
 17
units of mail at price p  to each addressee is given by19  
 ( ), .US N x N pxμν μ μ= −  
Observe that μ  plays two roles in this expression. It multiplies v  and x,  which are defined on a 
per-addressee basis, to yield total utility and output. Furthermore, it is an argument of v  to 
capture the idea that the degree of coverage of the network is perceived by the sender as a quality 
attribute of mail.  
 
We also introduce the possibility that receiving mail generates a “call externality”.20 Each 
addressee’s utility from receiving mail is given by ( )h x  so that the sum of addressees’ utilities is 
given by  
 ( ).UA N h xμ=  (4) 
The cost of the postal operator is specified by  
 ( ) ,C F N cxμ μ= +  
with 0F ′ >  and 0F ′′ > ,  so that profit is 
 ( ) .N px F N cxπ μ μ μ= − −  
 
For simplicity we assume here that the marginal delivery cost does not depend on the 
addressee’s location. However, the fixed cost of maintaining the network depends on location; 
this explains that F  is a strictly convex function of μ.   
1. Socially optimal solution 
To determine the optimal solution ( )x μ∗ ∗,  we maximize a utilitarian welfare W  (equivalent here 
to total surplus).21 We have 
 W US UA π= + +  (5) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), .N x N h x F N cxμν μ μ μ μ= + − −  (6) 
                                                                                                                                                             
values taken at equilibrium will in general differ. 
19This is a simplified version of the utility function used by Cremer et al. (2001). 
20On this terminology, see Riordan (2001). 
21For simplicity, we concentrate on the first-best solution and do not impose a break-even constraint on the operator. 
This does not affect the results pertaining to the determination of μ.  
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Differentiating with respect to x  and μ  yields: 
 ( )' 0W h x c
x x
ν μ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= + − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  (7) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), ' 0.W N x h x cx N Fνν μ μ μμ μ
∂ ∂= + − + − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂ ∂  (8) 
 
The two conditions have straightforward interpretations. Equation (7) states that the marginal 
benefit of x  (accounting for the call externality ( )h x′ ) equals its marginal cost. Similarly, in (8) 
the first two terms measure the marginal benefit of an increase in μ  while the last term 
represents the marginal cost.  
2. Profit-maximizing solution 
Writing profits as a function of μ  and x  yields 
 ( ) ( ), ,N p x x F N cxπ μ μ μ μ= − −  
where ( )p x μ,  is the inverse demand function. Differentiating yields the following FOCs 
 0pN x c
x x
π μ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= + − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  (9) 
 ( ) ( ), ' 0pN x N p x x cx Fπ μ μ μμ μ
∂ ∂= + − − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂ ∂  (10) 
 
Based on (7)–(8) and (9)–(10) the comparison between the social optimum ( )x μ∗ ∗,  and the 
profit maximizing solution ( )xπ πμ,  is not entirely obvious. One easily shows that x xπ < ,  but 
the comparison between πμ  and μ∗  is ambiguous.22  
 
We can gain some further insight by noting that for any level of x,  the derivative of W  with 
respect to μ , at the profit maximizing level of μ is simply  
 ,W US UA US UAW πμ μ μ μ μ μ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + + = +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
                                                 
22This is similar to the problem of quality choice by a profit-maximizing monopoly; see Varian (1992) p. 239–241. 
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because π μ∂ /∂  vanishes by definition when profit is maximized. In words, profit maximization 
yields a level of coverage that is too low (given )x  when consumer surplus (counting both the 
senders and the addressees) increases in μ.  It is plain from (4) that 0UA μ∂ /∂ > .  Furthermore, 
we have 
  ( ),US pN x px N xνν μ μμ μ μ
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂= − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  (11) 
 
This first term in this expression is positive. Intuitively, the quantity sold by a profit-maximizing 
monopolist is too small at both the intensive and the extensive margin and this term captures the 
extensive margin. The second term is the usual quality term the sign of which depend on the sign 
of 2 ( )p x xμ μ∂ , /∂ ∂ ;  see Varian (1987). 
 
